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1. Introduction 
There is now a growing literature on the economic effects of political violence on 
macroeconomic outcomes, a large part of which is reviewed by Frey et al (2004). One 
channel through which political violence impacts on the economy is through its 
effects on tourism. In the recent literature on violence and tourism, tourists respond 
not only to relative prices in different destinations, but also to as well as to risk 
factors. Political violence in one destination induces a standard substitution effect 
between countries. The main themes explored in the empirical literature on terrorism 
and tourism are (a) the extent of the substitution effect between risky destinations and 
safer choices (Enders, Sandler and Cauley, 1991; Enders and Sandler, 1992); (b) 
generalisation effects, where terrorism in one country cause a whole region to be 
perceived as risky (Enders and Sandler, 1992); (c) the time profile of reaction to 
terrorist events (Enders and Sandler, 1992); Fielding and Shortland, 2005) and (d) 
differences in attitudes to risks between countries (Tremblay, 1989, Fielding and 
Shortland, 2005). 
This paper extends the literature on tourism and violence by analysing the 
effects of several dimensions of political conflict on tourism in Egypt in the 1990s. 
During this period radical Islamist groups staged attacks of varying severity against 
Egyptian politicians, the security forces and civilians, and also targeted Egypt’s 
tourism industry directly. The paper firstly explores whether tourists respond to the 
level of violence in the polity in general or whether they respond mainly to violence 
targeted at tourist installations. Secondly we explore the effects of counter-violence. 
The Egyptian government used its security forces to suppress the opposition Islamist 
movements, rather than seeking political accommodation. The main approach has 
been to arrest and detain people suspected of political activism; but heavy-handed 
policing has resulted in civilian casualties in riots and demonstrations and gun-battles 
with armed extremists. The question of the effect of the state’s response to insurgent 
attacks on tourist flows has not yet been addressed in the context of violence and 
tourism, though tourists may be put off by the repression of opposition movements, 
human rights abuses and increased police presence around tourist installations. 
Thirdly we consider regional spillovers from the conflict in Israel/Palestine. The 
impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could stem from generalisation effects, but 
there are also several episodes of Israelis being targeted on Egyptian territory, a recent 
example being the bombing of the Hilton hotel in the Red Sea resort of Taba in  2
October 2004. An increase in conflict intensity in Israel could therefore raise the 
expected level of violence in Egypt. 
We use a more detailed and accurate measure of political violence than 
previously available. The dataset is based on details of civilian, tourist and security 
force casualties as well as arrests of Islamists reported in the Egyptian Al Ahram 
newspaper. We analyse monthly data on the conflict in Egypt; where previously only 
annual data has been used (Aly and Strazicich, 2000; Sakr and Massoud, 2003). We 
also examine the differences in attitudes to political violence among European and US 
tourists.  
The interest in the effect of Islamist violence on the Egyptian tourism industry 
extends beyond the parochial. Recent years have seen a number of terrorist attacks on 
foreign nationals in several countries, many of them linked to radical Islamist groups, 
for example in Tunisia, Indonesia, Kenya and Turkey. A detailed analysis of Egypt’s 
experience can inform policy-makers in countries in which the phenomenon of 
Islamist violence is more recent. Information on the severity and time profile of the 
effects of violent attacks gives information on potential subsidy requirements. 
Empirical evidence on the effects of repression on tourist choices can inform policy-
makers as to whether to repress Islamist movements or to seek accommodation with 
them. We also find evidence of regional spill-over effects, which have policy 
implications for regional approaches to tackling the problem of Islamist violence. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The following section 
gives some background information on the political conflict in Egypt. Section 3 
describes the model of tourist destination choice; section 4 discusses the data and 
methodology employed in the estimation. Section 5 discusses the results and section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. Violent political conflict in Egypt 
Egypt is a secular state in which Islamist movements have been excluded or 
marginalised from the political process. Islamist movements were banned under 
President Nasser, but a revival of Islamist groups started in the 1970s, their long-term 
goal being the establishment of an Islamic republic. Being excluded from the political 
process, some radical Islamist groups started a campaign of politically motivated 
violence. In the 1970s this was mainly inter-community violence between Islamists 
and the Coptic minority. In the 1980s violence increased in intensity in response to  3
Egypt’s rapprochement with Israel and the government’s pro-Western stance. Attacks 
were increasingly targeted at the state, taking the form of riots, shoot-outs with the 
police and assassination attempts on politicians and other public figures (most notably 
the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981). In the early 1990s the conflict 
escalated in response to the violent repression of Islamist movements by the 
government.  
  Most existing databases provide only a limited picture of the extent of political 
violence in Egypt, mainly focusing on trans-national terrorism and assassination 
attempts on important public figures. The International Institute for Counter-
Terrorism database
1 lists 22 attacks in Egypt from 1990 to 2000, 15 of which were 
targeted at the tourism industry. The Terrorism Research Centre
2 lists 24 terrorist 
incidents directed against tourists and politicians; the US Department of State’s 
publication “Patterns of Global Terrorism” reports 16 attacks against tourists and 6 
attacks on political targets in the same period.
3  
The reported incidents do not provide a reliable picture of conflict intensity in 
Egypt. A detailed search of politically motivated incidents in the Al Ahram news 
archive provided details of 39 attacks on the tourism industry between 1990 and 2000, 
in 31 of which foreign nationals were wounded or killed. Al Ahram also provides 
details on Islamist violence against state and civilian targets. The government’s 
response to Islamist violence is recounted in reports of arrests, trials, executions and 
extremists being killed or wounded by the security forces during arrests or in the 
policing of demonstrations and riots. Therefore our dataset is more precise than those 
based on sources outside Egypt
4. We are aware that Islamist violence and counter-
violence may have been subject to selective reporting as the Egyptian media are 
politically controlled
5. However, we assume that there were no major changes in the 
policy regarding what proportion of incidents are reported in the period under 
investigation. In this paper we focus on the four dimensions of violence discussed 
below. 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.ict.org.il 
2 http://www.terrorism.com 
3 http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/  
4 The publication Civil Society of the Ibn Khaldoun Centre has occasionally published political 
violence data, but details and updates are not available as the centre was closed and its founder and 
several of the research staff were arrested in 2000.  
5 The editor of Al Ahram is appointed by the President  4
Islamist violence directed against Egyptians 
Islamist violence against Egyptians is illustrated in Figure 1. It has taken a number of 
different forms. One aspect has been inter-community violence: attacks on the Coptic 
Christian minority in which Copts, their churches and their property were attacked. 
Many of these attacks were initially about property or “protection money” but 
acquired political overtones. Secondly Islamists were seeking to impose Sharia laws 
in Egypt and attacked individuals and activities considered to be “un-Islamic” such as 
liquor stores, beer deliveries, video-stores and cinemas showing foreign films as well 
as individuals engaged in “vice”. There was also political violence connected to 
elections, during which supporters of different candidates clashed in violent street 
fights. Thirdly there were assassination attempts on politicians and other public 
figures, such as poets, authors and academics, who were singled out for the moral or 
religious views taken in their writing. Finally there was the armed conflict between 
the extremist movements and the security forces in which extremists targeted both the 
official and secret police. Figure 1 shows an escalation of political violence in 1992 
and 1993, slowly tailing off from 1994 to 1998. In 1999 one of the violent Islamist 
Organisations Al Gama’at al Islamiya initiated a ceasefire, but violence reignited in 
2000.  
 
Attacks on Tourists 
Attacks on tourists and the tourism industry are part of the wider picture of political 
violence in Egypt. Targeting foreigners has helped radical Islamists to achieve a 
number of goals. Firstly, killing foreign nationals has generated national and 
international publicity in a country where the government tightly controls the local 
media. Secondly, tourism is a significant part of economic activity: according to 
Tohamy and Swinscoe (2000), it accounts for 11.6% of GDP if one includes the 
secondary effects of tourist spending. Disrupting the tourist industry has directly 
harmed government revenues and foreign exchange receipts. Attacking foreigners 
may also have had ideological objectives. Tourists could have been targeted as the 
indirect representatives of different ideological values and political cultures, which 
were seen to threaten national culture, tradition and religious convictions and whose 
presence brought little direct benefits to local communities (Aziz, 1996).    
  Attacks on tourists are illustrated in Figure 2. They have taken the form of 
sniper shooting at passing cruise ships, passenger trains and tourist buses, the  5
bombing of buses and cafes and the shooting of foreigners at tourist attractions. The 
main series of 25 attacks against tourists started in August 1992 and attacks occurred 
every 2-6 months until March 1995. A further series of three attacks occurred from 
November 1995 – March 1996 and the final two attacks in September and November 
1997, the latter of them the shooting of 88 tourists and locals at the temple of 
Hatshepsout in Luxor. This massacre undermined public support for the Islamists and 
there were no further attacks on tourists during the sample period. 
 
Counter-violence 
The Egyptian security forces’ response to Islamist violence reported in the Egyptian 
media includes arrests, detention (with and without trial) and death sentences for 
some of those convicted of terrorist offences. Often arrests have been preceded by gun 
battles in which both suspected Islamists and bystanders were killed and wounded. 
Demonstrations have also been subject to heavy-handed policing, often resulting in 
casualties and large-scale arrests. These events are summarised in Figure 3. Human 
rights organisations such as Amnesty International additionally report widespread 
human rights violations, such as torture and deaths in custody. Due to the nature of 
the reporting it is often impossible to distinguish between terrorists, members of the 
political opposition and innocent bystanders. Newspaper reports often refer to arrests 
of “dangerous terrorists” during which security forces find mainly “anti-government 
leaflets”. From January 1988 to December 2000 a total of 19,915 arrests of suspected 
Islamists were reported by Al Ahram. In the same period 605 civilians were killed and 
556 civilians were wounded by the security forces and 114 death sentences were 
carried out. 
 
Conflict in the Middle East 
Regional conflict has ambiguous effects on tourism to Egypt. On the one hand a 
“generalisation” effect has been observed, where tourist flows into whole regions are 
affected by terrorism in one country, even if other countries in the region are not 
themselves affected by terrorism.
6 Egypt has in fact seen a spill-over from the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, with Israeli citizens being attacked on Egyptian territory, 
particularly in the Sinai Peninsula, a popular holiday location for Israeli tourists. In 
April 1996 members of Gama’at al-Islamiyah killed eighteen Greek tourists in an 
                                                 
6 Enders and Sandler (1992)  6
assault on the Europa Hotel in Cairo, in the mistaken belief that they were Israeli 
tourists. Increasing violence in Israel would therefore be expected have a negative 
effect on tourism into Egypt. On the other hand tourists may substitute away from 
Israel and into Egypt if violence rises in Israel, as Egypt offers a similar mixture of 
cultural attractions and beaches. Violence in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza is 
illustrated in Figure 4. The data are provided by the Israeli NGO B’Tselem 
(http://www2.iol.co.il/btselem). Fatalities among Israelis in Israel, which are the best 
proxy for the risk to tourists in Israel, are highest in the period 1994-1996. Fatalities 
among the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, which fuel anti-Israeli and anti-
Western sentiment in Egypt, were relatively high between 1990 and 1994, relatively 
low between 1995 and 1999 and rose sharply with the beginning of the second 
Intifada in September 1999.  
 
3:  A Model of Tourist Destination Choice 
Our empirical regression equations ought to be consistent with a plausible model of 
individual decision-making. In this section we derive a regression equation from the 
standard discrete choice theory outlined in Maddala (1983). 
  The model concerns a population of people who have already decided to take 
a vacation, and are deciding where to go.
7 Let the net utility an individual i derives 
from taking a vacation in location m 5 {1,..., M} in month t be designated vimt. We 
will assume that each person’s utility is of the form: 
 
vimt = µmt (Xmt, εmt) + uimt         ( 1 )  
 
where µmt is the average level of utility from visiting location m in month t for the 
vacationing population and uimt is an individual’s idiosyncratic deviation from this 
average. Xmt is a vector of identifiable time-varying factors that impact on one’s net 
utility from a vacation in a particular location (including how expensive it is), and εmt 
is a stochastic term reflecting the unpredictable component of the average utility level 
(fads and fashions). We further assume that individual i chooses location m in period t 
if and only if: 
 
vimt = max (vi1t,..., viMt)         ( 2 )  
 
                                                 
7 See Enders and Sandler (1992) for an explicit model of a two-stage budgeting decision.  7
It can be shown (Maddala, 1983) that if for any two locations (m,n) the distribution of 
uimt is independent of that of  uint, and if each has a Weibull distribution, then the 











µ         ( 3 )  
So, for a large population, the ratio of the number of people in period t visiting 
location m (pmt) to the number visiting location n (pnt) can be written as: 
 




ln(pmt) – ln(pnt) = µmt (Xmt, εmt) – µnt (Xnt, εnt)        ( 5 )  
 
Location m here is to be interpreted as Egypt; the identity of the reference location n 
will be discussed later.  If we know the functional forms of µmt (.) and µnt (.), then we 
can fit equation (5) to time-series data. In what follows, we assume that it is possible 
to find a linear specification such that: 
 
ln(pmt) – ln(pnt) = Β′ [Xmt – Xnt] + εt        ( 6 )  
 
where εt is a linear function of εmt and εnt.  
  We will proceed with the assumption that [Xmt – Xnt] comprises (a) seasonal 
factors, (b) the relative enjoyability of the two locations and (c) the several 
dimensions of political violence in Egypt and Israel. Our regressions are based on an 
equation of the form: 
 
ln(pmt) – ln(pnt) = Σsθs.hst + η.E[wmt – wnt] + Β1′ E[Zmt+1] + Β2′ Zmt + εt   (7) 
 
hst is a dummy for month s. wmt is the enjoyability of location m in period t, to which 
an expectations operator is attached, because new visitors will only find out whether 
they like a place when they get there. Zmt is a vector of violence indicators in Egypt, 
the reference location n being assumed to be completely safe. Tourists are concerned 
about violence in the current month and also expected violence in the next month, 
because visits may straddle two months.  
One might also wonder whether monthly variations in the relative cost of 
different locations make a difference to tourist numbers. However, our empirical  8
measures of relative cost never produced robust, interpretable statistically significant 
coefficients. It seems that, in our sample period at least, monthly variations in cost 
had no substantial impact on tourism to Egypt. 
Application of the model requires us to specify the expectations formation 
process. We will work with the following assumptions: 
 
E[wmt – wnt] = α(L)[ln(pmt-1) – ln(pnt-1) ]        ( 8 )  
 
E[Zmt] = Α(L)′ Zmt-1          ( 9 )  
 
Equation (8) builds some herding behavior into the model: if a destination has been 
popular in the past, people are more likely to consider it today. Equation (9) states that 
expectations about the current risk of violence are based on the past frequency of 
violent incidents. Substituting equations (8-9) into equation (7), we will have an 
ARDL equation of the form:  
 
γ(L)[ln(pmt) – ln(pnt)] = Σsθs.hst + Γ (L)′ Zmt + εt                   (10) 
 
Since the variables in the empirical regression equations turn out to be borderline-
stationary, and we prefer not to make any a priori assumptions about their order of 
integration (as in Pesaran et al., 2001), we will be using the equilibrium-correction 
form of this equation: 
 
φ(L)∆[ln(pmt) – ln(pnt)] = Σsθs.hst + Φ (L)′ ∆Zmt                    (11) 
 
 – ω.[ln(pmt-1) – ln(pnt-1)] + Ω ′ Zmt-1 + εt  
 
where ω
 −1Ω indicates the long-run effects of violence on tourism. The elements of the 
violence vector Z are as follows. 
 
ln(tkw), where tkw is 1 + the number of tourists killed and wounded in Egypt. 
ln(cas), where cas is 1 + the number of arrests by Egyptian security forces.  
ln(csk), where csk is 1 + the number of civilians and security forces killed by radicals.  
ln(iki), where iki is 1 + the number of Israelis killed in political attacks in Israel.  
ln(kwg), where kwg  is 1 + the number of deaths in fighting in the West Bank / Gaza.  9
 
Logarithmic transformations are used to ensure that the variables are approximately 
symmetrically distributed. 
 
4. Empirical Modelling and Data 
4.1 Data 
Our sample period covers the 1990s, starting in March 1991 (to exclude any effects 
from the first Gulf war) and ending December 2000, the last month for which political 
violence data are available. Equation (11) is to be fitted to data for tourist arrivals into 
Egypt from (a) America and (b) Europe. In order to estimate the parameters of 
equation (11), we need to construct a dependent variable in which the number of 
visitors to Egypt from a certain population (American and European tourists 
respectively) is expressed relative to the number of visitors from that population to 
another location.  
We use tourist flows to Malta as the comparison country, as Malta can be 
considered as a “safe” alternative destination in the Eastern Mediterranean and has a 
consistent dataset of tourist arrivals disaggregated by nationality for the sample 
period.
8 Thus for the American tourist sample, pmt is interpreted as the number of 
American visitors to Egypt in a particular month and pnt is interpreted as the number 
of American visitors to Malta. The Egyptian Ministry of Tourism provides detailed 
statistics of monthly arrivals of tourists, as well as a breakdown of these tourists into 
European and US American visitors in its annual publication “Tourism in Figures”. 
The data on tourist arrivals into Malta are from Malta’s National statistics Office
9. 
The five violence variables are measured using the data collated from Al 
Ahram and from the B’Tselem database, which are described in Section 2 above. In 
all cases the violence statistics are expressed in terms of (the log of) the number of 
fatalities or arrests per month. 
 
4.2 Results 
Tables 1-2 report parameter estimates for our two samples – American and European 
tourists – using a lag order of two (selected on the basis of the Akaike Criterion; 
higher order lags are not statistically significant). Lags of csk and kwg were never 
                                                 
8 Ideally we would use a larger selection of “safe” destinations in the Eastern Mediterranean, such as 
Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, but it was impossible to obtain reliable data. Also, the recent histories of 
these countries may mean that they are not considered to be 100% safe. 
9 http://www.nso.gov.mt/  10
statistically significant in any regression equation, and were excluded from the 
regressions reported in Tables 1-2. Table 1 reports the regressions with the three 
elements of Z that are ever significant: tkw (tourist injuries and fatalities), cas (arrests) 
and  iki (deaths in Israel). Table 2 reports corresponding equations in which the 
dynamics are restricted so as to minimize the Akaike Criterion for the regressions. It 
can be seen that these restrictions make no substantial difference to those coefficients 
that are statistically significant in Table 1. Test statistics indicate that the null of zero 
autocorrelation in the regression residuals (and residual variances) cannot be rejected; 
neither can one reject the null that the residuals are normally distributed.
10 
  In both the American and the European sample, an F-test for the joint 
significance of the levels variables in Table 1 – that is, a test of the joint restrictions ω 
= 0 and Ω = 0 in equation (11) – indicates that there is a statistically significant long-
run relationship between the variables of interest. Comparing the F-statistics with the 
critical values reported in Pesaran et al. (2001) indicates that the restrictions can be 
rejected even if we assume that the variables are I(1), and certainly if they are I(0).  
  We do not dwell on the individual regression coefficients, but interpret the 
regressions by plotting the implicit response of [ln(pmt) – ln(pnt)] to a permanent unit 
increase in each of the elements of Z.
11 The plots, based on the coefficients reported 
in Table 2, appear in Figures 5-6. Note that in these figures, the effect of a permanent 
change in iki (fatalities in Israel) or cas (arrests) on EU tourist numbers is only 
temporary, because the respective elements of Ω are insignificantly different from 
zero. Moreover, a change in cas has no impact on American tourist numbers, even in 
the short run, because the respective elements of both Φ and Ω are insignificantly 
different from zero.  
  As one might expect, attacks on tourists in Egypt reduce tourist numbers; for 
both American and Europeans, the effect is permanent, as illustrated in Figures 5(a) 
and 6(a). In both cases, the effect of a hypothetical change in the violence level is very 
gradual, taking a couple of years to come close to its asymptote. However, the effect 
on European tourist numbers is much larger. In the long run, the elasticity for 
                                                 
10 For the American sample, normality of the residual is achieved only when dummy variables for two 
outliers (May 1991 and September 1992) are included. Omission of the two dummies makes no 
substantial difference to the fitted regression coefficients. 
11 For these illustrative purposes, we assume that each element of Z is strictly exogenous, and hold the 
other elements constant in each case. The figures are designed to provide an intuitive picture of the 
dynamics of the regression equations; they are not impulse response functions in the strict sense.  11
Europeans is around 1.4, as compared with around 0.5 for Americans. One possible 
explanation for this difference is that many Europeans travel to Egypt for the sun and 
sand, not for its cultural attractions; this is unlikely to be the case for Americans, for 
whom Florida is much closer. If tourists attracted to Egypt for cultural reasons are less 
sensitive to the violence (perhaps they are more highly educated on average, and 
better able to work out which locations are relatively safe), then we might well see 
more reaction on average among the Europeans. 
  There is even more asymmetry between Americans and Europeans with regard 
to the effect of violence in Israel, as indicated in Figures 5(b) and 6(b). A unit increase 
in ln(iki) leads to an immediate 5% increase in American numbers, increasing to 
around 30% in the long run; it leads to a 3% decrease in European numbers, an effect 
that diminishes very rapidly within a couple of months.
12 It appears that ceteris 
paribus American tourists substitute between Egypt and Israel as tourist destinations: 
there is increasing the demand for Egyptian holidays, if the risk of travelling in Israel 
increases. European tourists, however, respond to shocks in political instability in 
Israel by substituting away from Egyptian holidays. Again, this may reflect 
demographic differences between the two populations. 
 
Long run elasticities of tourist numbers to a permanent increase in violence 
Long-run elasticities  Americans Europeans 
ln(tkw) -0.521  -1.432 
ln(iki)   0.294  none 
 
Figure 6(c) shows the effect of a unit increase in the arrests variable ln(cas) on 
European tourists. Demand for Egyptian holidays contracts by a little over 1% with a 
unit increase in ln(cas), the maximum effect being two months after the shock. This 
effect diminishes very rapidly thereafter. On average, European tourists do respond to 
changes in the level of the state’s response to insurgency, which might be viewed by 
some as excessive. However, the effect is relatively small and temporary. American 
tourists seem not to pay any attention to this dimension of the conflict. There is no 
                                                 
12 The results from the European sample should be treated with some caution, as in the unrestricted 
Table 1 regression there is a positive coefficient on contemporaneous ∆ln(iki) with a t-ratio of 1.8, 
which is significant at the 10% level. But the t-ratio falls very close to zero when other insignificant 
variables are removed, and the AIC indicates the omission of contemporaneous ∆ln(iki) from the 
regression. 
  12
significant response of American tourist numbers to changes in ln(cas), even in the 
short run. 
 
5. Interpretation and Conclusion 
Our results show that the campaign of radical Islamist organisations succeeded in 
inflicting heavy losses on the Egyptian tourist industry when their attacks were 
directly targeted at the tourist industry. Even though the actual danger of being caught 
up in a violent attack was extremely small even at the height of the conflict, many 
tourists decided to stay away from Egypt. Tourists mainly appear to care about their 
own safety, rather than being influenced by low level political conflict or the human 
rights record of their destination choice. Direct attacks on tourists have an almost 
immediate effect on people’s destination choices and it takes about two years for the 
full effect of a successful attack to be felt.  
  There are interesting differences between US and European tourists. European 
tourists are more sensitive to political violence in Egypt than their American 
counterparts. This may be because a large number of Europeans go to Egypt on beach 
holidays, for which there are many alternative destinations. European tourists 
therefore react very strongly to violence against the tourism industry. For US tourists 
the emphasis is more likely to be on Egypt’s archaeological attractions, for which 
there are no close substitutes. Europeans also respond negatively to surges in counter-
violence, whereas US tourists do not. A possible explanation is that human rights 
issues are less well publicised in the US media than in Europe, whereas attacks on 
foreigners do make international headlines and influence official travel advice. 
  Conflict in Israel has ambiguous effects on the Egyptian tourist industry. 
While American tourists seem to substitute holidays in Egypt for holidays in Israel 
when violence increases in Israel, Europeans substitute away from Egypt when 
conflict in the region escalates.  
  Given these results there are strong policy implications regarding the 
importance of not letting a political conflict escalate to the point where radical splinter 
groups attack foreign nationals to publicise their cause. A heavy-handed state policy 
against extremists may also have negative effects on tourism, at least in the short run. 
There is some (limited) evidence for such an effect with respect to European tourists. 
The results might also motivate a policy of subsidising the tourist sector in response to 
attacks on tourists until tourism levels recover. The actual cost to the tourist industry  13
is likely to be higher than the changes in tourist numbers suggest, as tourist flows in 
the aftermath of an attack are often stimulated by aggressive price cuts.
13 Tourism 
revenues tend to take much longer to recover than the number of tourists (Tohamy 
and Swinscoe, 2000).  
  Finally, rising violence in Israel discourages European tourists from taking 
Egyptian holidays, at least in the short run, while attracting more US tourists; overall 
the long-run response is positive, as the American effect dominates. However, 
political violence in Israel does occasionally spill over into Egypt, resulting in attacks 
on tourists and hotels; this has unambiguously negative consequences for the 
Egyptian tourism industry, underlining the importance of the Egyptian government’s 
involvement in the Middle East peace process. 
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Table 1: Unrestricted Regression (Heteroskedasticity Corrected Std. Errors) 
The equations also include a seasonally varying intercept. 
 
∆ln(pm/pn)t regression, American sample 
  coefficient  s.e.  t ratio  partial R
2 
∆ln(pm/pn)t-1  -0.31575 0.10280  -3.07  0.0968 
∆ln(pm/pn)t-2  -0.05447 0.07745  -0.70  0.0056 
∆ln(cas)t  -0.00308 0.01026  -0.30  0.0010 
∆ln(cas)t-1  -0.00589 0.01453  -0.41  0.0019 
∆ln(cas)t-2  -0.00558 0.00952  -0.59  0.0039 
∆ln(tkw)t  -0.02561 0.01820  -1.41  0.0220 
∆ln(tkw)t-1   0.09573  0.03209   2.98  0.0919 
∆ln(tkw)t-2   0.03174  0.02019   1.57  0.0273 
∆ln(iki)t   0.03676  0.01626   2.26  0.0549 
∆ln(iki)t-1  -0.03320 0.02904  -1.14  0.0146 
∆ln(iki)t-2  -0.03298 0.02027  -1.63  0.0292 
ln(pm/pn)t-1  -0.24871 0.06244  -3.98  0.1528 
ln(cas)t-1   0.01170  0.01561   0.75  0.0063 
ln(tkw)t-1  -0.17201 0.04494  -3.83  0.1427 
ln(iki)t-1   0.09174  0.03700   2.48  0.0653 
 
σ = 0.15, R
2 = 0.67, AIC = -3.53, resid. normality: χ
2(2) = 1.88 [0.39], LM AR: F(1,87) = 0.05 [0.82] 
LM ARCH: F(1,86) = 0.00 [0.98] 
  
∆ln(pm/pn)t regression, European sample 
  coefficient  s.e.  t ratio  partial R
2 
∆ln(pm/pn)t-1  -0.25729 0.10270  -2.50  0.0652 
∆ln(pm/pn)t-2  -0.27271 0.07567  -3.60  0.1261 
∆ln(cas)t  -0.02137 0.01109  -1.93  0.0396 
∆ln(cas)t-1   0.00741  0.01670   0.44  0.0022 
∆ln(cas)t-2   0.00762  0.01095   0.70  0.0054 
∆ln(tkw)t  -0.00852 0.02119  -0.40  0.0018 
∆ln(tkw)t-1   0.16475  0.04932   3.34  0.1103 
∆ln(tkw)t-2   0.10997  0.03646   3.02  0.0918 
∆ln(iki)t   0.03316  0.01847   1.80  0.0346 
∆ln(iki)t-1  -0.05417 0.04085  -1.33  0.0192 
∆ln(iki)t-2  -0.01134 0.02687  -0.42  0.0020 
ln(pm/pn)t-1  -0.19806 0.03775  -5.25  0.2342 
ln(cas)t-1  -0.02434 0.02003  -1.22  0.0161 
ln(tkw)t-1  -0.26344 0.07931  -3.32  0.1092 
ln(iki)t-1   0.06264  0.04520   1.39  0.0209 
 
σ = 0.15, R
2 = 0.89, AIC = -0.81, resid. normality: χ
2(2)  = 1.57 [0.46], LM AR: F(1,89) = 0.28 [0.60]  
LM ARCH: F(1,88) = 0.14 [0.71], joint significance of levels variables: F(4,90) = 18.88  15
Table 2: Restricted Regression (Heteroskedasticity Corrected Std. Errors) 
The equations also include a seasonally varying intercept. 
 
∆ln(pm/pn)t regression, American sample 
  coefficient  s.e.  t ratio  partial R
2 
∆ln(pm/pn)t-1  -0.30854 0.08311  -3.71  0.1222 
∆ln(tkw)t  -0.02559 0.01600  -1.60  0.0252 
∆ln(tkw)t-1   0.04604  0.01494   3.08  0.0876 
∆ln(iki)t   0.04178  0.01529   2.73  0.0701 
ln(pm/pn)t-1  -0.20908 0.05144  -4.06  0.1430 
ln(tkw)t-1  -0.10897 0.02142  -5.09  0.2072 
ln(iki)t-1   0.06155  0.02139   2.88  0.0771 
 
σ = 0.15, R
2 = 0.64, AIC = -3.65, resid. normality: χ
2(2) = 2.69 [0.26], LM AR: F(1,98) = 0.27 [0.60] 
LM ARCH: F(1,97) = 0.10 [0.76]  
 
∆ln(pm/pn)t regression, European sample 
  coefficient  s.e.  t ratio  partial R
2 
∆ln(pm/pn)t-1  -0.26082 0.05337  -4.89  0.1928 
∆ln(pm/pn)t-2  -0.32897 0.05369  -6.13  0.2729 
∆ln(cas)t  -0.01334 0.00825  -1.62  0.0255 
∆ln(tkw)t-1   0.17909  0.03750   4.78  0.1857 
∆ln(tkw)t-2   0.11782  0.03079   3.83  0.1277 
∆ln(iki)t-1  -0.03281 0.01570  -2.09  0.0419 
ln(pm/pn)t-1  -0.19380 0.03088  -6.28  0.2826 
ln(tkw)t-1  -0.27763 0.04598  -6.04  0.2671 
 
σ = 0.15, R
2 = 0.88, AIC = -0.87, resid. normality: χ
2(2)  = 1.78 [0.41], LM AR: F(1,99) = 0.32 [0.57] 
LM ARCH: F(1,98) = 0.51 [0.48] 16
 
Figure 1: Islamist Violence against Egyptians 
□ civilians wounded by civilians    ■ security forces wounded 




Figure 2: Attacks on Tourists 
□  tourists killed        ■ tourists wounded 
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Figure 3 
□ civilians wounded by security forces   ■ arrests (x 0.1) 
■ civilians killed by security forces    
 
 
Figure 4: The Israel / Palestine Conflict 
 
□ Palestinians killed in WBG     ■ Israelis killed in WBG 
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Figure 5 
(a) Response of US tourist arrivals to a permanent unit increase in the number of 
tourists attacked in Egypt (ln(tkw)), first 36 months 







(b) Response of US tourist arrivals to a permanent unit increase in the number of 
violent deaths in Israel (ln(iki)), first 36 months 









(a) Response of EU tourist arrivals to a permanent unit increase in the number of 
tourists attacked in Egypt (ln(tkw)), first 36 months 










(b) Response of EU tourist arrivals to a permanent unit increase in the number of 
violent deaths in Israel (ln(iki)), first 36 months 










(c) Response of EU tourist arrivals to a permanent unit increase in the number of 
suspected Islamists arrested (ln(cas)), first 36 months 
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